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Editors' Introduction
On three October afternoons last fall, we attended a presentation of the
Storrs Lectures, entitled "The Ages of American Law." The William Lucius
Storrs Lectureship was endowed in 1889 by Mary and Eliza Robinson, in
memory of their great-uncle, the Chief Justice of the Connecticut Supreme
Court.a The first lecture was given the following year by Judge Cooley on
the Interstate Commerce Commission; he had just been appointed its first
Chairman. The Storrs Lectures have remained the Law School's most dis-
tinguished lecture series; even a partial list includes some of the most in-
fluential legal figures and ideas of the past 85 years.b Sometimes annually,
sometimes not, a speaker from outside the Law School is invited. This
year the Lectures coincided with the Sesquicentennial of the Law School,
and Grant Gilmorec had promised to deliver them.
Professor Gilmore is one of the most respected and best liked of a popular
and respected faculty.d Yet, so far as we know, he has never said a personal
word, of any kind, to any student; indeed very different kinds of students
claim him as their own, speculating on opinions never glimpsed beneath
a deeply mannered ambivalence.
About 5'10", with a ruddy complexion and two pairs of frequently ex-
changed, thick-lensed glasses, Professor Gilmore has a somewhat stout, Ten-
niel-drawn physique. As he talks he emphasizes words through sudden and
arresting changes in the clipped rumble and volume of his voice, like
Theodore Roosevelt in the old reels appearing to speak through clenched
teeth beneath a bristling mustache. As he raps an open book with his
glasses or chops the air in casual impatience, his gestures remind us of
someone thinking alone, trying to recall a familiar address or telephone
number. Former lecturer in French at Yale College, Reporter for Article 9
t Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University.
a. See E. FORGEUs, THE HISTORY OF THE STORRS LECTURESHIP IN THE YALE LAW SCHOOL
1 (1940).
b. Among the more prominent Storrs lecturers were: James Bradley Thayer (on the
Law of Evidence); John Marshall Harlan (on the Constitution); Kazuo Hatoyama (on the
Civil Code of Japan); Sir Frederick Pollock ("The Expansion of the Common Law"); Carl
Becker ("The Heavenly City of the 18th Century Philosophers"); Edward Corwin ("The
Twilight of the Supreme Court: A History of Our Constitutional Theory"); Robert
Hutchins ("The Higher Learning in America"); Roscoe Pound ("An Introduction to the
Philosophy of Law"); Karl Llewellyn ("The Common Law Tradition"); and, the most
famous, Benjamin Nathan Cardozo's 1921 lectures, "On the Nature of the Judicial Process."
c. Professor Gilmore's brief hiatus at the University of Chicago Law School (1965-1973)
made it possible for this confirmed Yale man (A.B. '31; Ph.D. '36; LL.B. '42; Professor
since '46) to be invited.
d. Of some, of Professor Gilmore's predecessors it was written,
They taught classes because their contracts with the University required them to do
so; being conscientious craftsmen they worked hard on their classes; they were en-
tirely indifferent to what their students thought about them or about their teaching;
they did not ask to be loved.
(Written of Corbin, Moore and Sturges; manuscript on file at the Yale Law Journal.)
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of the UCC, coauthor of the standard treatise in Admiralty, Ames Prize and
Coif Award winner, Gilmore seems to us, more than the Great Man, the
Solitary. We anxiously awaited the lectures, entitled "The Age of Dis-
covery," "The Age of Faith," "The Age of Anxiety."
On the afternoon of the 29th we arrived early and took seats near the
front of the long room. The room quickly filled and the Dean introduced
Professor Gilmore with a touching, if hurried pride. Gilmore seemed dis-
tracted; he wore an uncomfortably new white shirt with corners still stiff
at the back of the collar. He began:
We are asked to believe that this year marks the hundred and fiftieth
anniversary of the founding of this Law School. If that is true, the
history of the School very nearly spans the history of American law.
It seems appropriate, therefore, to devote these lectures to a review
of the century and a half during which the Yale Law School and the
American legal system have, at times somewhat uneasily, co-existed.
We sat next to Professor Deutsch and his wife, who had been Gilmore's
research assistant for the preparation of his treatise, Security Interests in
Personal Property. We noted other faculty in the room who must have
been students of Gilmore's, just as he had been part of a generation trained
by Corbin.
Before the 18th century, lawyers looked upon themselves-as they
were looked upon by others-as being essentially plumbers or repair-
men. By the end of the 18th century we had come to think of our-
selves as philosophers-an upgrading of our status which the legal
mind naturally found irresistible.
Gilmore then introduced the "Age of Discovery" by presenting its an-
tecedents: prior to the second half of the 18th century there was no notion
of a generalized theory of law. Blackstone had no predecessors. It was that
half century-when "many remarkable minds set out, almost at the same
time, to discover the laws of history, the laws of social and economic be-
havior, the laws, we might say, of law"-that encompassed America's con-
struction of its own legal system. Having cut our political ties to England,
conscious of our immense potential for wealth and power, self-critically
committed to a legal system that made some kind of overall sense, we were
a society poised for takeoff-a society capable of producing the Constitution.
That society confronted the task of selectively transplanting the English
common law in a period of dizzying change (and overseas that law was
experiencing similar stresses, evoking the creative, Mansfieldian approach
to judging). To this task of constructing a ship while under sail were added
the tensions of a potentially fragmenting federalism. The history of pre-Civil
War American law is, in the main, an account of how law coped success-
fully, astonishingly-through the codification movement, through inspired
judicial interpretation,e through Kent's Commentaries and Story's original
and impressive treatises-with the structural forces of instability.
e. Thus, by the simple expedient of paying no attention whatever to the known
meaning of the words chosen by the Constitutional draftsmen, the Court effectively
federalized-nationalized-the law relating to all water borne transportation, an area of
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Summing up this period, Gilmore followed Llewellyn in finding its only
counterpart in the great classical period of Roman Law, the third century
A.D.f He ended the first lecture by saying, "The best definition of a golden
age is, no doubt, that it is one which can never be repeated-or recaptured."
There was enthusiastic applause.
The following afternoon we returned to the lecture room. Well before
the lecture was to begin, it became apparent that, with even the aisles al-
ready full, the lecture site would have to be moved. We decamped to the
auditorium.
In a speech in 1963, Professor Gilmore had said,
No lawyer worthy of the name can ever be either truly a conservative
or truly a radical: at one and the same time we must somehow devote
ourselves to the preservation of tradition, which we do not greatly
respect, and to the promotion of change, in which we do not greatly
believe.g
Appropriately modest words for our chastened present; but for 1963? Yet
we suspect that his oft-quoted epigram was not racy prescience. Rather it
is a kind of gentleman's code, a statement of the perspective that structures
the professional monologue of the Solitary, "fastidious, ironic, aristocratic."h
If so, it is hardly paradoxical that the Storrs Lectures should adopt his-
torical themes; the past, in the hands of the quick-witted, is just as un-
predictable but not nearly so repetitious as the present.
Professor Gilmore spoke, that day, about "The Age of Faith." Discussing
the period, roughly from the Civil War to World War I, of the "law's
black night," he remarked that, paradoxically, American law had appar-
ently achieved some of its greatest triumphs during that time. The major
categories we use to study our legal system were reduced to order and cer-
tainty, indeed were invented, in this period.
Christopher Columbus Langdell, who in 1870 became the first Dean of
the Harvard Law School, was the symbol of the age, and his one guiding
idea the organizing principle of its energies. The idea was that law was
"a science," and from this thesis several corollaries flowed. If legal truth
is a species of scientific truth, then once discovered, it must necessarily
endure. It follows as a methodological consequence that legal study will
economic activity which was of course even more vital in the period before the
construction of railroads ....
In an extended analysis of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), Professor Gilmore
demonstrated the method by which Justice Story promoted and substantially achieved
national uniformity across a broad spectrum of the substantive law through a disingenuous
yet quite creative rendering of a technical point of negotiable instruments law. That
method advised courts not to take a narrow view of precedent, to look to the entire range
of the available literature, scholarly as well as judicial, and to take into account the
economic and social consequences of their decisions. "In short, Story was preaching what,
a hundred years later, would be, somewhat barbarously, referred to as a policy-oriented
approach to law."
f. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 45 (1960).
g. Gilmore, The Truth About Harvard and Yale, YALE LAW REP., Winter 1963, at 9.
h. Spoken of Professor Gilmore by the late Herbert Packer on the presentation of
the Coif Award in 1967. Quoted in Gunther, Herbert L. Packer, 26 STAN. L. RaV. 1005,
1007 (1974).
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be devoted to the progressive simplification of formulae, and to an effort
to reduce their number while increasing their explanatory power. The
Langdellians thus sought, with considerable success, to design unifying
theories which would embrace broad areas of the common law-theories
which meant that the status of parties and the origin of their disputes
were not to be taken into account.
Since hitherto the principal characteristic of American law had been its
"chaotic diversity, its sensitivity to changing conditions, its fluidity," the
American case law would support Langdell's theories only if it was ignored.
The Langdellians did precisely that, citing a few English reports and a
limited number of "right" cases in this country. At about the same time
the West Publishing Company established the National Reporter System
and the Langdellian revolution was complete: a precedent-based, largely
nonstatutory system must have difficulty coping with such fecundity. The
treatises of the period soon changed from simply identifying for the prac-
titioner what the cases were, to stating the "correct rule," often in black
letter text, and then justifying it in terms of broad generality. The sup-
porting cases came in at the bottom of the page in typically factless string
citations. Of the moving spirit of all this, Gilmore said, "Langdell seems
to have been an essentially stupid man who, early in his life, hit on one
great idea to which, thereafter, he clung with all the tenacity of genius."
We were sitting next to Professor Bittker and just before such lines
were finished he would chuckle, always a bit more quickly, a little sooner
than the rest. This both distracted and alarmed the young lady sitting
next to us, who seemed unsure whether the Professor was very, very bright
or had sneaked a look at the text. Of the speaker himself, we could notice
a buoyant change since the first lecture. Professor Gilmore's extreme per-
sonal reticence seemed tempered by his appreciation of the institutional
significance of the Lectures, and of the fact that he owned both a dramatic
reading style and the face of Clemenceau. At any event, he turned next
to the man whose biography he is presently writing.
"If Langdell gave the new jurisprudence its methodology, Holmes, more
than anyone else, gave it its content." Holmes argued that the function of
law is to channel private aggression in an orderly fashion. He wrote: "The
first requirement of a sound body of law is that it should correspond
with the actual feelings and demands of the community, whether right or
wrong."I In his radical and despairing pessimism, Holmes cut against the
grain of most 19th century thought, which was characterized by an op-
timistic belief in the progressive amelioration of the human condition.
Furthermore, he seems to have had a far more sophisticated idea about
the nature of scientific inquiry than most 19th century social scientists,
including the Langdellians. And, finally, he believed in the necessary insta-
bility and inconsistency of any given state of the law.
Despite all this, the lectures in which Holmes displayed these ideas to
the world were enthusiastically received. Published the following year un-
der the title The Common Law, they purported to be an historical survey
i. O.V. HOLMES, JR., THE COON LAW 36 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
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of the development of a very few common law principles which had re-
currently manifested themselves in the various subjects Holmes chose to
deal with, principally tort and contract. The Langdellians, the believers
in the one true rule of law, ignored Holmes's insights into the complex
interplay between new materials drawn from life and old materials not
quite absorbed from historyi but accepted Holmes's extremely general and
equally parsimonious principles of liability.
Holmes's accomplishment was to make Langdellianism intellectually re-
spectable. In the academic world, the success was complete. Concurrently,
events of the period seemed to evoke opinions from the judiciary that
unconsciously embodied Langdell's notions.
The post-Civil War judicial product starts from the assumption that law
is a closed logical system. Judges do not make law; they merely declare
the law, which, in some Platonic sense, already exists.k Seldom did judges
make any attempt to explain the reasons for their own decisions; it was
enough to say, "The rule which we apply has long been settled," citing
numerous cases, without facts.
Langdell had nothing to do with shaping the new judicial approach.
By his time we had put behind us the urgent problems which had con-
cerned Kent and Story and had largely spent our energies in the Civil
War. Even the pace of technological change seems to have slowed. Langdell
was the first to sense the altered mood and give it theoretical expression.
Such expression equally suited the economic movers and shapers of the day.
Referring, we hoped, to the economic theories of the early 20th century,
Professor Gilmore reminded us:
There has always been a symbiotic relationship between the academic
establishment, which provides the theories, and the economic estab-
lishment, which appreciates being told that the relentless pursuit of
private gain is, in the last analysis, the best way of serving the public
interest.
j. Langdellian jurisprudence led its adepts to the conclusion that law is a neat and
tidy structure of interlocking logical propositions. Holmes began his first lecture
... with the celebrated epigram: "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience." The flashing thrust was apparently meant as, and understood by his
audience as, a direct attack on Dean Langdell, who may indeed have been seated in
the front row.
Gilmore, The Age of Antiquarius: On Legal History in a Time of Troubles, 39 U. CHI. L.
REv. 475, 480 (1972).
k. See W.H. AUDEN, Law Like Love, COLLECTED SHORTER POEMS 1927-1957, at 154 (1966):
Law, says the judge as he looks down his nose,
Speaking clearly and most severely,
Law is as I've told you before,
Law is as you know I suppose,
Law is but let me explain it once more,
Law is the Law.
Yet law-abiding scholars write:
Law is neither wrong nor right,
Law is only crimes
Punished by places and by times,
Law is the clothes men wear
Anytime, anywhere,
Law is Good morning and Good night
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But even the economists must have
felt a grudging admiration for the lawyers who could see that the case
of a working man bargaining with his corporate employer over wages
and the case of a Vermont farmer dickering with a summer resident
over the price of a cord of firewood could both be reduced to the
paradigm of A who voluntarily contracts with B.
As Gilmore had written in another context, "Never, I dare say, has any
field of law appeared to be as perfectly structured, as free from any kind
of fault or flaw, as the law of contracts in Williston's great treatise."1
Ending the second lecture, Gilmore responded to the ovation with a
short bow.
The third lecture, on the last day in October, was again delivered in
the auditorium. Gilmore's review of our legal past inexorably advanced
on the present. The first two lectures had prepared us for an erudite re-
view of America's grand designs and hopeful revolutions. Few expected
what seemed to us the savage nihilism of the third lecture, which is here
reprinted.
Twenty-five years ago, Professor Gilmore wrote of Karl Llewellyn in
these pages that he "and his co-conspirators were right in everything they
said about the law. They skillfully led us into the swamp. Their mistake
was in being sure that they knew the way out of the swamp: they did not,
at least we are still there."m And, Gilmore told us that afternoon, for
tomorrow and tomorrow.
As we sat in the auditorium that afternoon, we had the feeling that
ironies far beyond our comprehension, beyond even our guessing, con-
tinually pressed on Professor Gilmore.n Sometime ago, speaking of the law
itself, he had written, "The more things change, the French proverb re-
minds us, the more they are the same: our gains, it may be, are illusory,
but so are our losses."o
The Dean introduced him once again, an introduction acknowledged
this time with a confident bow. Gilmore began in his customary rumble,
his thick-lensed glasses reflecting the auditorium lights. His hands chopped
the air with an offhanded impatience as he dashed hopes across our eager
faces. When the third lecture was over, we rose and clapped and cheered.
P.C.B.
1. Gilmore, supra note j, at 481.
m. Gilmore, Book Review, 60 YALE L.J. 1251, 1252 (1951).
n. Holmes, writing to Pollock, following the overwhelmingly positive reception to the
former's appointment to the Supreme Court:
There have been stacks of notices of me all over the country.... They are so favor-
able that they make my nomination a popular success but they have the flabbiness
of American ignorance.... It makes one sick when he has broken his heart in trying
to make every word living and real to see a lot of duffers, generally I think not even
lawyers, talking with the sanctity of print in a way that at once discloses to the
knowing eye that literally they don't know anything about it.
Letter from O.V. Holmes, Jr. to Sir Frederick Pollock, Feb. [Sept.?] 23, 1902, in HoLiEs-
POLLOCK LErraRs 106 (M. Howe ed. 1961).
o. Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1048 (1961).
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The Age of Anxiety
It may well be that in the law Ages of Faith are of relatively
brief duration. The pleasant and comforting myth of the law's in-
ternal consistency and external stability cannot, for long, sustain it-
self. The facts of life cannot, for long, be suppressed. Every Blackstone
must have his Bentham; every Langdell must have his Llewellyn. The
specifics of the breakdown, like the specifics of the original construc-
tion, are of course largely determined by the accidents of time and
place.
The first sign that the heavenly city of the Langdellians was not
for this world was, I suggest, the revival and apparent success of the
American codification movement, which had not been heard from
since before the Civil War. The codifiers had always taken commer-
cial law as their preferred area of operation. In a period of twenty
years beginning in the late 1890's a series of uniform commercial
statutes-of which the most important were the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law' and the Uniform Sales Act 2-was drafted, promulgated
under the respectable auspices of the American Bar Association, and
widely enacted throughout the country.
The presence of the American Bar Association as an approving spon-
sor makes clear that the codifying statutes were not the work of wild-
eyed revolutionaries. This was indeed a project dear to the heart of
the orthodox establishment and it is symbolically fitting that Samuel
Williston, the greatest Langdellian of them all, became the principal,
we might even say the official, draftsman of the new statutes. But
why should codification have suddenly become respectable?
Langdellian jurisprudence in its origins had been essentially an
attempt to achieve unity of doctrine on the case-law level. Langdell
and his contemporary followers were common lawyers to a man. The
"one true rule of law" idea was of course almost immediately sub-
jected to intolerable pressures by the mounting flood of case reports.
The writers of the great treatises sought to keep the situation under
1. 5 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. (1943), promulgated in 1896 by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and subsequently adopted by every state; the
Conference had been set up, as a sort of affiliate or subsidiary, by the American Bar
Association. The Negotiable Instruments Law was the first project in which the Con-
ference engaged.
2. 1 UNIFORM LAws ANN. (1950), promulgated in 1906 by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and subsequently adopted by 37 states; the Sales
Act was the first of several statutes drafted for the Conference by Professor Samuel
Williston of the Harvard Law School.
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control by carefully distinguishing between the relatively few correct
cases (many of them English) and the great piles of trash which filled
the bound volumes of the reports. However, another aspect of our late
nineteenth century theory caused trouble at exactly this point. Judges
were not supposed to make law; they merely followed precedents. So,
what was a judge who took the stare decisis business seriously-as
many did-to do when it turned out that the precedents in his state
were, according to the learned gentlemen from Cambridge, wrong?
The factual disunity of American case law from state to state may
indeed have increased during the latter part of the nineteenth cen-
tury as the nationalizing principle of Swift v. Tyson 3 gradually lost
its strength. The Swift v. Tyson device had not infrequently succeeded
in producing nationally acceptable solutions to regionally controverted
issues. As that device passed out of use American case law apparently
faced a bleak future of rampant parochialism.
American interest in codification had no doubt been stimulated by
then-recent English developments. The English, on their home turf,
had of course paid not the slightest attention to Jeremy Bentham's
strident manifestos calling for universal codification. The Benthamite
idea apparently seemed more attractive when the question for deci-
sion became how best to secure the benefits of English civilization-
including English law-for India. At all events the English undertook
and patiently carried out the ambitious project of providing India
with English-inspired codes.4 The success of the Indian project seems
to have led to a hesitant beginning in codifying some of the more
troublesome areas of domestic law with the Bills of Exchange Act
(1882) 5 and the Sale of Goods Act (1893)." Having gone so far, the
English stopped and proceeded no further. Their two Victorian codi-
fying statutes are still in effect. Proposals for further codification in
this century7 have, after a flurry of initial publicity, been quietly
abandoned.
The American codifiers-particularly after Williston's services had
been enlisted-seem to have assumed that their principal function was
to free judges, crippled by their devotion to stare decisis, from the
fetters of aberrant precedents in unenlightened jurisdictions. Indeed
3. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
4. See THE ANGLO-INDIAN CODES ix-xxviii (V. Stokes ed. 1892).
5. 45 & 46 Vict., c.61.
6. 56 & 57 Vict., c.71.
7. See, e.g., GREAT BRITAIN LAW COMMISSION, LAW COMMISSIONS ACr, 1965: FrosT
PROGRAMME OF THE LAW COMMISSION 6, 10 (1965).
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the only truly enlightened jurisdiction was what came to be referred
to in moot court competitions at the Harvard Law School as the State
of Ames.8 But with the law of Ames made available to all in statutory
form, the true light could shine everywhere.
In truth, statutes like the Uniform Sales Act were not statutes at
all. That is, they were not designed to provide rules for decision. Draft-
ed in terms of loose and vague generality, what they were designed
to provide was access to the prevailing academic wisdom. Thus the
rules for decision in sales cases were to be found not in Professor
Williston's Uniform Sales Act but in Professor Williston's treatise9
on the Law of Sales. This aspect of the codification was apparently
generally understood. The courts-and, presumably, counsel-paid no
attention at all to the Sales Act; they paid enormous attention to
Professor Williston's treatise.
What we had was not so much a codification as a non-codification-
a method of preserving the common law purged of all impurities. The
apotheosis of the non-codification movement was reached a generation
later with the Restatements of the 1920's and 1930's in which all the
fundamental principles of the common law were reduced to authori-
tative statements printed in black-letter text. Not since the Digest of
Justinian, which patiently collected for the use of sixth century By-
zantium the wisdom of third century Roman jurisprudence, had there
been anything like the American Restatements."° Indeed the fate of
both these extraordinary legal artifacts-Digest and Restatements-was
the same: the hurricane continued to howl; the foundations continued
to slip away; the wisdom of the past could not save.
We may take the provision in successive generations of, first, a statu-
tory non-codification with the Uniform Sales Act and its successors
and, next, a non-statutory non-codification with the Restatements as
having obscurely reflected an almost instinctive realization on the
part of the Langdellians-who enthusiastically supported both ventures
-that things were not going as they were supposed to go-as, for a
generation or more, they had seemed to be going.
Our dawning Age of Anxiety is perfectly symbolized by the mys-
8. James Barr Ames became Dean of the Harvard Law School in 1895, succeeding
Langdell in that post.
9. S. WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT CoMMoN LAW AND UNDER
THE UNIFORM SALES Aar (1909).
10. The Restatements were produced by the American Law Institute. For a history of
the Institute and its guiding force, William Draper Lewis, see Goodrich, The Story of the
American Law Institute, 1951 WASH. U.L.Q. 283. The work of the Institute was financed
by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation totalling nearly $2,500,000. Id. at 288.
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terious-almost mystical-figure of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo. Car-
dozo's father had been a corrupt lower court judge allied with the
Tweed Ring in New York, who had suffered disgrace when Tweed's
organization was broken up. The son apparently felt that his mission
was to redeem his father's sins. Ascetic to an extraordinary degree in
his personal tastes, he seems to have decided at an early age to re-
nounce the pleasures and temptations of the world in favor of a life
of intellectual meditation. The accounts of all those who knew him
tell us of a man of an extraordinary and compelling personal charm
as well as of great sweetness of character. By the universal testimony
of his contemporaries Cardozo was a saint.11
Before his appointment to the Supreme Court of the United States
in succession to Justice Holmes, Cardozo served for twenty years on
the New York Court of Appeals and evidently dominated that great
court, intellectually, throughout his tenure. Cardozo was a truly in-
novative-or, if you will, creative-judge, of a type which had long
since gone out of fashion. In his opinions, however, he went to extra-
ordinary lengths to hide his light under a bushel. The more innova-
tive the decision to which he had persuaded his brethren on the court,
the more his opinion strained to prove that absolutely no novelty-
not the slightest departure from prior law-was involved. Since Car-
dozo was one of the best case lawyers who ever lived, the proof was
invariably marshalled with a masterly elegance. It is not until the
reader gets to the occasional angry dissent 12 that he realizes that Car-
dozo had indeed been turning the law of New York upside down.
During his twenty years Cardozo succeeded to an extraordinary degree
in freeing up-and, of course, unsettling-the law of New York. It is
true that he went about doing this in such an elliptical, convoluted,
at times incomprehensible fashion that the less gifted lower court New
York judges were frequently at a loss to understand what they were
being told.'
3
11. See, e.g., B. SHIENTAG, THE SEVENIY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BIRTI[ OF JUSTICE
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO 1-2 (1945):
What words are there to describe the charm of an uncommon gentleness, of a
singular simplicity that goes with spiritual distinction; to picture that candor, that
rare integrity and purity of mind, that life of intellectual opulence and moral fervor?
What words have we to adumbrate that exquisite grace of humility, that abiding
serenity, that intense tenderness and compassion which flowed from having himself
suffered?
12. See, e.g., Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N.Y. 369,
379, 159 N.E. 173, 177 (1927) (Kellogg, J., dissenting); Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230
N.Y. 239, 245, 129 N.E. 889, 892 (1921) (McLaughlin, J., dissenting); MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 395, 111 N.E. 1050, 1055 (1916) (Bartlett, C.J., dissenting).
13. See, e.g., Comfort v. McCorkle, 149 Misc. -826, 268 N.Y.S. 192 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
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In 1920 Cardozo came to this School and delivered a series of Storrs
lectures. I think it is fair to say that the two most celebrated books in
the history of American jurisprudence are Holmes on The Common
Law14 and Cardozo on The Nature of the Judicial Process.'5 The two
books, however, have nothing in common beyond the facts that no-
body reads them and everybody praises them.
Cardozo's book, as a matter of strict fact, had almost no intellectual
content whatever. He addressed himself to the problem of how a judge
goes about deciding a case. In the great majority of all cases, he said,
the outcome is foredoomed; the past has foreclosed the present. Only
in an occasional case does the process of adjudication involve a crea-
tive act on the part of the judge. In such a case, Cardozo suggested,
the judge may-indeed must-look to what he called the "methods"
of philosophy, history, tradition and sociology. By the "method of so-
ciology" he meant that the judge, at least in a situation where he
found nothing else to guide him, was entitled to take into account
the effect of his decision on social or economic conditions. Toward
the end of his last lecture he introduced what one might call the
theme of the anguish of judicial decision:
I was much troubled in spirit, in my first years on the bench, to
find how trackless was the ocean on which I had embarked. I
sought for certainty. I was oppressed and disheartened when I
found that the quest for it was futile. I was trying to reach land,
the solid land of fixed and settled rules, the paradise of a justice
that would declare itself by tokens plainer and more command-
ing than its pale and glimmering reflections in my own vacillating
mind and conscience .... As the years have gone by, and as I
have reflected more and more upon the nature of the judicial
process, I have become reconciled to the uncertainty, because I
have grown to see it as inevitable. I have grown to see that the
process in its highest reaches is not discovery, but creation; and
that the doubts and misgivings, the hopes and fears, are part of
the travail of mind, the pangs of death and the pangs of birth,
in which principles that have served their day expire, and new
principles are born.'0
The thing that is hardest to understand about The Nature of the
Judicial Process is the furor which its publication caused. Nothing
can better illustrate the extraordinary hold which the Langdellian con-
cept of law had acquired not only on the popular but on the legal
14. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881) (M. Howe ed. 1963).
15. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
16. Id. at 166-67.
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mind. Cardozo's hesitant confession that he-and other judges-were,
on rare occasions, more than simple automata, that they made law
instead of merely declaring it, was widely regarded as a legal version
of hard-core pornography. By this unseemly indiscretion, it was sug-
gested, Cardozo had forfeited any claim he might otherwise have had
to be considered as a fit candidate for a seat on the Supreme Court
of the United States.1' In time the furor abated and he did indeed
take his seat on the Supreme Court without any visible sign of public
indignation. But a less saintly man than Cardozo might, in 1920, have
found himself running close to the reefs of impeachment.
Cardozo was, we might say, a revolutionary malgrd lui who was af-
fectionately attached to the structure which, imperceptibly, almost sur-
reptitiously, he proceeded to subvert and destroy. There was, however,
nothing affectionate, imperceptible or surreptitious about the pro-
cedures of the group, based mostly in the law schools, who shortly
came to be known as the Legal Realists. They appeared to be, quite
consciously, in favor of tearing everything down. On further analysis
the case may prove to be that, just as Cardozo was a revolutionary
malgrd lui, the Realists were Langdellians malgrd eux. In times of
revolutionary change, it is often difficult to be sure who is on which
side.
What the curious episode which came to be known as American
Legal Realism was about has long been a puzzle not only to outsiders
but to the participants. The late Karl Llewellyn, whom most people
regarded as the leading Realist, insisted throughout his life that there
had never been either a Realist "school" or a Realist "movement."
Professor William Twining, one of the few English scholars who has
ever devoted much time to the study of our transatlantic law-ways,
seems to have concluded, in a recent book:" on Karl Llewellyn and
the Realist Movement, that Legal Realism, if there was such a thing,
was an exclusively American phenomenon which bore no relationship
to any developments, past or present, in English legal history or in
the history of any of the civil law systems. Indeed Professor Twining
seems to suggest, by implication, that Legal Realism was, so to say,
a playoff for the Ivy League championship with the combined facul-
ties of the Columbia and Yale Law Schools taking the field against
Harvard. I think there was more to it than that.
17. "[Cardozo] was aware that his conception of the judicial process was not the
generally accepted one; and he had a slight hesitation about the publication of his lectures.
With a touch of humor, he remarked, 'If I were to publish them I would be impeached.'"
Corbin, Foreword to B. CARnozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAw, at vi (1966).
18. W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973); I have re-
viewed Professor Twining's book in 22 Am. J. Comp. LAw 812 (1974).
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In a narrow sense, the so-called Realist controversy consisted of a
series of articles which appeared in the law reviews during the 1930's
and which, today, makes up as dreary a course of reading as you can
hope to find anywhere. When Llewellyn denied that there had ever
been a Realist school or movement, he was presumably referring to
the law review controversy. It is surely true that, on the law review
level, the issues at stake, which had never been clearly defined, be-
came progressively more confused and more insubstantial as the de-
bate went on. But neither Llewellyn nor anyone else was ever in-
clined to deny that a fundamental shift in American legal thought
had taken place in the decades following World War I-a shift which
the law review controversy, which was in itself inconsequential, served
to underline or emphasize.
The one thing on which the academic theorists who emerged after
World War I agreed was that the traditional or Langdellian way of
achieving doctrinal unity on the level of case law or Restatement was
absurd. However, in demonstrating the absurdity of the Langdellian
thesis, the new generation of theorists used as their principal weapon
one which Langdell himself had provided: the idea that the reported
cases are the laboratory materials for our systematic or scientific study.
In its Langdellian version that had meant that we were to study a few
correct cases and disregard the rest. The post-Langdellians proposed
to look at all the cases.
Arthur Corbin of this faculty may have been the first, as he was
the greatest, of the post-Langdellian scholars. Corbin took no part
in the Realist controversy and in any event his intellectual formation
had been complete long before World War I. Llewellyn, who had
studied under Corbin and been closely associated with him, regarded
Corbin as his spiritual father in the law' 9 and most of the Realists
treated Corbin with a respect which they showed to almost no other
figure of the earlier generation.
Corbin counseled not only that we should study all the cases but
also that we should study them not so much for their doctrinal state-
ments as for what he liked to call their "operative facts." Furthermore,
Corbin practiced what he preached, both in his teaching and in his
writings which culminated in his great treatise on Contracts. 20 In
Corbin we no longer find the high level generalities supported by
factless string citations which had characterized the Langdellian litera-
19. Indeed, Corbin's copy of Llewellyn's THE COMMON LAw TRADMON iS inscribed:
"For Dad-in the hope that he will find it worthy of his great teaching.... Karl."
20. A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS (1950).
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ture, whose greatest achievement had been no doubt the other great
treatise2 1 on Contracts written by Corbin's dear friend and lifelong
opponent, Samuel Williston. In Corbin we find painstaking factual
analyses of all the cases, even those of minor importance which are
relegated to the footnotes. Indeed the practice of paying an almost
obsessive regard to the facts of cases, while almost entirely disregarding
their apparent doctrinal content, became after World War I, and has
since remained, a principal characteristic of most American legal
scholarship.
Unity of doctrine cannot survive that way of dealing with cases. At
all events, in this country it did not survive. The process of disinte-
gration is already evident in Corbin's own work. For example, he
concluded that there was not, and never had been, such a thing as a,
or the, doctrine of consideration. At various times and in various
places and in a great variety of circumstances courts had imposed con-
tractual liability. The only purpose of studying the field was to de-
termine under what circumstances the liability had been imposed.
There is no harm, Corbin cheerfully concluded, in using the word
"consideration" which has been bequeathed to us by history. But, he
added, if you want to use it, you should be aware that it means, and
always has meant, many different and inconsistent things.
22
Some of those who followed in Corbin's footsteps carried his teach-
ing to the point of intellectual nihilism. Wesley Sturges, whom gen-
erations of students at this Law School revered as the greatest of teach-
ers, was one. Early in his career Sturges published a few law review
articles, which were of an almost unbelievably narrow scope and focus
-for example, an elaborate study of the North Carolina case law on
the nature of mortgages, 23 a subject of no conceivable interest to
Sturges or anyone else. The point of the study was to demonstrate
that the North Carolina law of mortgages made no sense of any kind
and could most charitably be described as a species of collective in-
sanity on the march. At about the same time he put together a case-
book for a new course which he called Credit Transactions: 24 the
21. S. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920). See Corbin's tribute to Williston in
Corbin, Samuel Williston, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1327 (1963).
22. 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 110, at 494 (1963):
In each new case, the question for the court is "should this promise be enforced."
Its problem is not merely to determine mechanically, or logically, whether it falls
within Professor Wiseacre's statement of the doctrine of consideration or complies
with some commonly repeated definition. This is not to say that the Professor's state-
ment, or Restatement, or the learned judge's dictum, can be safely disregarded.
23. Comment, Validity of a Mortgage on Business Assets to Secure the Proprietor's
Capital Contribution, 34 YALE L.J. 769 (1925).
24. W. STURGES, THE LAW OF CREDIT TRANSACTIONS (1930).
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casebook consisted principally of the most absurd cases and sequences
of cases, along with the most idiotic law review comments, which he
had been able to find. The law, as Wesley Sturges conceived it, bore
a striking resemblance to the more despairing novels of Franz Kafka.
Sturges himself had the courage of his bleak convictions. Ex nihilo
nihil. He wrote almost nothing during the remainder of his long
career.25 No one could match Sturges in his penetrating analysis of
the most complex legal materials but he saw no point in playing
children's games. I was his student and served under him while he
was Dean of this School: he was a lonely, great and tragic figure.
Sturges was not in any sense typical of his generation. Most of his
contemporaries thought of themselves as having broken with Lang-
dellianism and all its ways but nevertheless accepted the basic tenet
of Langdellian jurisprudence: the one true rule of law. Corbin, Sturges
and others had demonstrated that there was no salvation in case law.
But there might be other ways.
The idea that the facts of cases are all-important led in many minds
to the conclusion that what we needed were more facts or better
ways of getting at the relevant facts. It appeared that the social scien-
tists, particularly the sociologists, had made great advances in tech-
niques of what came to be called empirical research. But was not
law itself a social science? And were not the techniques of empirical
research quite as applicable to legal behavior as they were to any
other kind of social behavior? Particularly among the self-proclaimed
Realists the slogan "law is a social science"20 became an article of
faith and young men who were beginning their careers were sternly
advised to abandon the futile study of doctrine and to devote them-
selves instead to empirical studies.
Since the 1930's a great many empirical study projects on legal
subjects have been undertaken, typically funded by lavish foundation
grants and widely publicized at well-attended press conferences. The
fate of most of these projects has been to wither on the vine without
producing any fruit. It seems to be a fact of life that it is much more
25. Nothing, that is, on conventional law or legal theory. He became interested in
arbitration as a promising alternative to judicial adjudication and published a compre-
hensive treatise on that subject, W. STURGES, A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS
AND AWARDS (1930).
26. See, e.g., Cook, The Logical and Legal Basis of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J.
457, 475 (1924) ("lawyers, like the physical scientists, are engaged in the study of objective
physical phenomena .... As lawyers we are interested in knowing how certain officials
of society-judges, legislators, and others-have behaved in the past, in order that we
may make a prediction of their probable behavior in the future."); cf. Oliphant, A Return
to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A.J. 159 (1928) ("Not the judges' opinions, but which way they
decide cases will be the dominant subject matter of any truly scientific study of law.").
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fun to think about or talk about doing empirical research than it is
to do it. And even if you are able to employ armies of research as-
sistants to gather all the facts there are, the gathered facts have a disap-
pointing way of turning out not to mean anything beyond themselves.
The obvious alternative to a judicial solution of social and economic
problems is a legislative solution. Courts can decide only the cases that
happen to come before them and are in any case burdened by their
own procedural limitations in trying to find out about the issues which
the cases present. A legislature through its committees can analyze a
problem in depth and cut through to a rational solution. If a con-
tinuing supervision or regulation is required, an administrative agency
which will quickly develop its own expertise is the answer. In the first
flush of enthusiasm doing all this seems like the merest child's play.
Jeremy Bentham seems to have believed that running up a complete
code for England, France or the United States27 would be as simple
as rolling off a log. In this country in the twentieth century we seem
to have had more than our fair share of Jeremy Benthams.
The so-called progressive movement which had flourished at about
the time of World War I had put great stress both on individual gov-
ernment service as a way of life and on the role of government in
prescribing for our social ills. States which came under the influence
of progressive ideology-Wisconsin under the Lafollettes, Pennsylvania
under Gifford Pinchot-were hailed as laboratories for experiments in
social progress. The possibility that the experiments might fail seems
never to have been seriously considered. With the coming of the New
Deal the opportunity for experimentation on a much grander scale
was at hand.
Many of the academic Realists, gladly forsaking their lives of scho-
larly research, enlisted for the duration and came to be numbered
among the leading movers and shakers of the New Deal period. They
drafted statutes by the gross and set up administrative agencies by the
score. Having created a new world, they rested and hallowed it. Oddly,
the problems did not go away and Utopia was as remote as ever.
But their statutes have remained on the books and their administra-
tive agencies in being. What to do about these mouldering statutes
and elderly agencies will presently become an urgent problem of law
reform.
The enthusiasm for legislative solutions was by no means restricted
to federal legislation in the public sector. The American Law Institute,
27. See J. BENTHAM, JUSTICE AND CODIFICATION PETITIONS (1829).
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after having finished restating the common law, drifted, apparently
almost without knowing what it was doing, into what became the
massive codification project called the Uniform Commercial Code.28
With appropriate symbolism, Karl Llewellyn, the proto-Realist, be-
came the architect of the Code and its principal draftsman. Llewellyn,
who was much less of a revolutionary than he was thought to be, seems
to have preferred a loose, open-ended style of drafting. If Llewellyn
had had his way, the Code would have turned out to be another statu-
tory non-codification or Restatement. In large part, however, he was
overridden and outvoted by the proponents-mostly practitioners-of
a much tighter drafting style. Llewellyn had envisioned a statute which
would set general guidelines of policy and not much more. The prac-
titioners who participated in the project wanted a statute which gave
specific answers to specific problems and that approach largely pre-
vailed. In the detail and rigid precision of much of its drafting, the
Code will cause us all much grief.
While the legal scholars were becoming social scientists and the legal
activists were drafting statutes and administering agencies, what were
the judges doing? The conventional wisdom of the 1930's was that the
judges had had their day, which would not come again. The Realists
had stripped them of their trappings of black-robed infallibility and
revealed them to be fallible human beings whose decisions were mo-
tivated much more by irrational prejudice than by rules of law. Fur-
thermore our law, state and federal, was in the process of being re-
duced to statutory form with most of the significant continuing
problems being committed to the expertise of administrative agencies.
The judicial role was bound to become progressively more modest,
more mechanical, more unimportant. What happened, as is frequently
the case, was the opposite of what the conventional wisdom assumed.
The judicial activism of the Warren Court in areas of public or
constitutional law has for a long time been a matter of public praise
or blame. The truth is, I suggest, that the birth, or rebirth, of judi-
cial activism considerably antedated the formation of the Warren
Court and has been quite as much a factor to be reckoned with in the
state courts as in the federal courts and in areas of private law as in
areas of public law. Present prospects are that this surge of activism
will continue, no matter who may sit on the Supreme Court of the
United States or on our less august tribunals.
In an earlier lecture I suggested that the post-Civil War judges and
28. I was associated with the Code project, as a member of the drafting staff, from
1946 on. The following comments are based on my memory of what took place.
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theorists seemed, on the obscure level of instinct, to be working to-
ward the same goals. The patterns which the theorists provided and
the results which the judges arrived at seemed to be in perfect har-
mony. Among the striking features of our post-Civil War jurisprudence
were its fondness for abstraction and for building unitary theories as
well as its insistence on restricting both liability and damages.
No doubt the obscure correspondence between theory and practice
holds true in any period. It has surely been true in this century that
the reforms which the professors called for in their law review articles
were already being provided, or had been provided, by the judges,
without anybody having noticed what had happened. The universal
abstractions faded, the unitary theories disappeared, the range of lia-
bility became wider and wider and plaintiffs' damages flourished like
the green bay tree.
29
The rebirth of judicial activism has gone hand in hand with a
rebirth of the federalizing or nationalizing principle. In 1938 a unani-
mous Supreme Court declared that the federal law doctrine of Swift
v. Tyson 30 was, and always had been, unconstitutional.3 1 The Swift v.
Tyson device, which had over a long period been of great service, had,
for reasons which have been discussed, ceased to work in this century.
No doubt the only sensible course was to get rid of it, as the Supreme
Court did. But, having scrapped the machine that no longer worked,
the Court immediately set about providing a substitute that would
work.
Even at the time the Erie case was decided, a prescient observer
might have commented that the case's apparent meaning could hardly
be taken as its true meaning. It was unlikely to the point of impos-
sibility that control over the development of the substantive law was
to be returned to the several states just at the time when the powers
and presence of the federal government in all areas of our national
life had reached a point previously unknown in our history. And that
proposition, which was clearly enough true in the years preceding
World War II, had long since passed the point of no return by the
time we had come to the end of the war period.
The post-Erie federalization of the law was not established all at
once by the fiat of a single great case. Rather, the federalizing prin-
ciple expressed itself in a variety of ways as the courts reacted to the
29. See generally G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACrS § 90, comments d, e, at 217-19 (1973).
30. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
31. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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reality of ever-increasing federal power.32 Insofar as a principle ever
emerged, it was that the presence of any kind of federal interest in
a case was enough to support the conclusion that decision should be
governed by federal law rather than by the law of any state.
Conclusion
As we pause to observe our sesquicentennial, what can we make
of our hundred and fifty years of law? And is there anything relevant
that we can say about the next hundred and fifty years-or even about
the next fifty (since it is at least arguable that the rhythm of the law
is measured in fifty-year cycles)?
The principal thing that we can learn from our study of the past
is that we cannot predict the future. At the beginning of these lec-
tures I referred to the great eighteenth century hypothesis which led
to the invention not only of law or jurisprudence but also of the whole
range of the social sciences. That hypothesis was that there were ob-
servable regularities in social behavior or in societal development.
Once the assumed regularities or developmental sequences had been
identified, isolated for study and accurately described, it should follow
that the future course of events could be predicted. With the power
to predict would of course go the power to control. Once the forces
at work are known and understood, they can be channeled or har-
nessed to serve the wants and needs not necessarily of mankind at
large but at least of those who are in a position to manipulate them.
We have never had to face up to that frightening possibility for the
excellent reason that no historian, social scientist or legal theorist
has ever succeeded in predicting anything. That is, the great hypo-
thesis, after two hundred years of anguished labor, has produced noth-
ing. The assumed regularities have never been discovered; the formu-
lations of each generation have regularly collapsed when the realities
of the following generation have become known. Nevertheless the
dream dies hard. Each generation of investigators, recognizing the
errors of the past, has taken up the struggle anew in the conviction
that the cause of past failure lay in inadequate methodology and in
the optimistic belief that with more refined methods the trick will
finally be pulled off. The historians have ransacked the archives. The
sociologists have perfected increasingly complicated techniques for
32. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 383 (1964).
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carrying out their empirical research and have surely succeeded in
finding out more and more about less and less. At the present time
only the economists, who for two hundred years have seen their
theories regularly run off the rails, seem ready to give up and go out
of business.
Let us assume that the lesson of the past two centuries is that the
great hypothesis was fundamentally in error. The truth is that there
are no observable regularities in the course of human events. The
truth is that we cannot predict anything. The truth is that it is not
possible to make scientific statements about history, sociology, eco-
nomics-or law.
The "law is a science" analogy has conditioned our thinking for
a long time. It has not only set our goals for us but has dictated our
methods of study and research. It has told us not only what we were
looking for but how the search was to be conducted. If we can rid
ourselves-or if our successors can rid themselves-of the illusion that
law is some kind of science-natural, social or pseudo-and of the twin
illusion that the purpose of law study is prediction, that will be a
clear gain for the future of our law.
It is also an illusion to think that the golden age will ever come
again. In our history the golden age of the law was in the period
before the Civil War. That may well have been a unique response
to a unique historical situation. It cannot be an everyday occurrence
that a society already in an advanced stage of its own development-
literate, prosperous, buoyant, even euphoric-undertakes to create its
own system of law, borrowing from a respected foreign system but
feeling in no way constrained by any particular rule or precept of
that system. We will, for obvious reasons, never find ourselves in that
situation again.
The extraordinary achievement of our first half century of law may
well have contributed to the excesses of the following half century. In
the 1870's it must have been tempting to conclude that since, through
law, much had been achieved, it followed that, through law, everything
could be achieved-including the ultimate goals of scientific predic-
tion and scientific control of the future course of our society. In the
1970's we look back on an unpleasant half century which has been
largely devoted to destroying the illusions which had commended
themselves to the men of the 1870's. It may not be unreasonable to
assume that, after our half century of demolition work, we are in for
a half century of rebuilding-perhaps with Mr. Ralph Nader replacing
Dean Langdell at the controls.
1041
The Yale Law Journal
One of the problems that our rebuilders-whoever they may prove
to be-will have to deal with is how to go on living with a largely codi-
fied law after the codifying statutes have themselves passed out of
date. It appears to be a fact of legislative life that it is much easier
to get a statute enacted in the first place than it is to get the statute
periodically revised so that it will make sense in the light of changed
conditions. And it is obviously true that the more tightly the statute
was drafted originally the more difficult it becomes to adjust the
statute to changing conditions without legislative revision.
Over a fairly long period of time the problem of obsolescent statutes
will solve itself. No statutory draftsman has a crystal ball in which he
can read the future. The best he can do is to try to make some kind
of sense out of the past. A well-drafted statute will usually deal sen-
sibly with the issues which have come into litigation during the
twenty or twenty-five years which preceded the drafting. However, the
focus of litigation has a way of shifting unexpectedly and unpredict-
ably. New issues, which no one ever dreamed of, present themselves
for decision. With luck, the case will be that the old statute will turn
out to have nothing to say one way or the other about the new issues,
which can then be decided on their own merits. As that process con-
tinues the old statute gradually becomes irrelevant and is, so to say,
reabsorbed within the mainstream of the common law. But that takes
a long time.
The most difficult period in the life of a statute-as in the life of
a human being-is what we call middle age. The statute is, admittedly,
no longer what it once was but there is life in the old dog yet. An
occasional subsection still has its teeth and subparagraph (3)(b) may
burn with a gem-like flame. Beginning in the 1930's we went through
our youthful orgy of statute drafting. Over the next little while we
shall be passing through our statutory middle age.
The rebirth of judicial activism will help us through this difficult
period. Statutory language-like any other kind of language-always,
or almost always, presents alternative possibilities of construction.
There will, however, be cases where even the most disingenuous con-
struction will not save the day. The wisdom of the past fifty years
has been that, in such a situation, a court must bow to the legislative
command, however absurd, however unjust, however wicked. I should
not be surprised to see this piece of wisdom rewritten over the next
fifty years. We may well come to believe that the reformulation of an
obsolete statutory provision is quite as legitimately within the judicial
function as the reformulation of an obsolete common law rule.
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When the problem is one of freeing up a rule of state law, deci-
sional or statutory, the new federalism will of course simplify matters.
Fashioning a "federal rule" where none previously existed mostly
involves either choosing between conflicting rules which have been
previously formulated or adapting an obsolescent rule to serve a new
purpose. The increasing localization of many types of litigation in
the federal courts-such as bankruptcy proceedings, for one example
-frequently presents the situation where the apparently applicable
rule of state law is one which the state court has not passed on for a
generation or more. That situation caused a good deal of trouble and
frustration in the immediate aftermath of the Erie case when, for a
few years, the apparent meaning of Erie was taken to be its true mean-
ing. But we have now reached the point where no federal judge who
has the slightest flair for his craft has to be concerned with even the
most horrifying clinker which he may pick up from the nineteenth
century dust heap.
The problem of freeing up the federal law is both more difficult
conceptually and more serious practically. It is difficult to the point
of impossibility to draw the attention of a crisis-ridden Congress to
areas of law reform which, although urgent, have not erupted in po-
litical controversy. It is rapidly becoming equally difficult to draw
the attention of a crisis-ridden Supreme Court, which is able to de-
cide only a small fraction of the cases which are submitted to it, to
the desirability of reconsidering its own ill-considered or obsolete
holdings. Perhaps the inferior federal courts will have to experiment
with the novel idea that, in case of need, they should not follow or
consider themselves bound by obsolete Supreme Court cases.33
We have always turned to the federalizing-or nationalizing-prin-
ciple as the solution to the obvious dangers of a fragmentation of the
law on the state level. It may well be that the next period will see
the emergence of what might be called an internationalizing principle.
The global threats of environmental pollution and of long-term short-
ages of essential raw materials including food are only the most ob-
vious examples of pressing problems which simply cannot be handled
on the national level. Other problems of the same sort will be revealed
as we proceed. The solutions, if there are to be solutions, will have
to be international solutions-peacefully negotiated or imposed by
force. One of the incidental by-products of an internationalizing ap-
proach to intractable problems would no doubt be the at first im-
perceptible spread of the idea that the internationalizing principle
33. See Note, Lower Court Disavowal of Supreme Court Precedent, 60 VA. L. R~v. 494
(1974).
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could be used to free up the increasingly arthritic joints of our middle-
aged federal statutes and of the rules of our decisional law which have
qualified for senior citizen status.
If indeed we turn from nationalism to internationalism as a prin-
ciple of organizing our law, I hope that we-or our successors-will be
able to avoid the Jeremy Bentham syndrome. The Benthamite disease
consists, essentially, in the belief that there is only one more river
to Jordan and that, once we have crossed the river, everything will
be tickety-boo. A system of law, internationally organized, will be no
more stable, no more predictable, no more just-or for that matter,
unjust-than systems of law nationally organized.
Law is always an instinctive response to disorder, never a reasoned
approach to the quite different problem of achieving order. For ten
years or so after World War II the slogan World Peace through World
Law was one which appealed to many men of good will. That always
seemed to me to be a case of putting the cart before the horse. Con-
ceivably, we might get World Law through World Peace but not the
other way around. And if we did achieve World Law through World
Peace-the Romans, you will remember, are said to have made a desert
and called it peace-there is no reason to believe that we would be
any better off, legally speaking, than we are now.
In an earlier lecture I commented on the extraordinary degree of
popular enthusiasm for the idea of law during the strange, dead period
which followed the Civil War, which I have called our Age of Faith.
Justice Holmes, before his death, was translated into a folk-hero, much
to his own amusement and secret pleasure. Lawyers, naturally enough,
responded warmly to their new-found position in the public esteem
and proceeded to assure their admirers that the law and its acolytes
were indeed worthy of an unbounded respect, a mystical adoration.
In one of the great advertising campaigns of the century, the idea of
law-of what came to be called the rule of law-was ridiculously over-
sold, which led to great confusion in the public mind when it later
became clear that ours was a government not of laws but of men and
that justice under law was notably unequal.
Law reflects but in no sense determines the moral worth of a so-
ciety. A reasonably just society will reflect its values in a reasonably
just law. The better the society, the less law there will be. In Heaven
there will be no law and the lion will lie down with the lamb. An
unjust society will reflect its values in an unjust law. The worse the
society, the more law there will be. In Hell there will be. nothing
but law, and due process will be meticulously observed.
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